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Alex Morrison *
The Theoretical and Practical Feasibility
of a United Nations Force'
Introduction
The recent expansion of United Nations peacekeeping operations
throughout the world has rekindled debate on whether, and to what
degree, standby agreements can improve the international community's
ability to manage conflict. Critics of existing ad hoc approaches to muster-
ing forces have proposed various alternative models of arranged force
packages and deployment/sustainment arrangements. Two such models
are standing forces and standby forces. Standing forces are trained, paid,
and commanded by the United Nations, while standby forces consist of
donated material and volunteer troops earmarked for U.N. duty, but are
supported, trained, and commanded by their respective national authori-
ties. A related issue is the desirability of establishing a force headquarters,
rather than a force per se, to manage pre-deployment planning and to
handle the command and control aspects of a mission.
The notion of a global army is nothing new. Indeed, in recent times,
interest in creating a standing intervention force has surfaced time and
again. Praised by some and pilloried by others, a permanent U.N. army
represents perhaps the pinnacle of international cooperation. After
examining the roots of this concept, this Article traces the evolution of
various force models. This Article also examines the post-1991 period
where the hitherto discredited standing force model has seen something
of a renaissance, despite formidable and enduring obstacles to its imple-
mentation, and discusses a recent Canadian initiative to improve U.N.
rapid reaction capability.
* President of The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping
Training Centre, in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia; Executive Director of The Canadian
Institute of Strategic Studies in Toronto, Ontario; and Editor of Canadian Defence
Quarterly. He served 34 years in the Canadian Army. From 1983-1989, he was a member
of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations and finished his tour there
as Minister-Counsellor. The author is indebted to David Rudd of the Canadian
Institute of Strategic Studies for his help in drafting this paper.
1. An earlier version of this paper ("Efforts to Establish UN Stand-by
Arrangements: An Historical Account and Appraisal") was delivered in February 1995
to the first meeting of the Canadian Initiative to Improve the Rapid Reaction Capability
of the United Nations. See Alex Morrison, The Fiction of a UN Standing Army, THE
FLETcHER F. OF WORLD ArF., Winter/Spring 1994, at 83.
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I. From War to Peace
An atmosphere of anticipation and optimism characterized the interna-
tional political context of the mid-1940s. On the threshold of victory in
Europe, the Great Powers, led by the United States, collectively tallied the
costs of global conflict and resolved to ensure that such conflagrations
would never occur again. Recalling the failure of the League of Nations to
check German expansion between the World Wars and the hopelessly ill-
conceived Kellogg-Briand Pact which sought to outlaw war entirely, the
Great Powers laid the groundwork for new institutional guarantees (or at
least safeguards) against inter-State aggression at the Dumbarton Oaks
"conversations" in the summer of 1944.
A year earlier, American Secretary of State Cordell Hull had devised
the moral framework from which these guarantees would be derived. He
suggested that the most politically and militarily powerful members of the
international community should refrain from going to war, lest a third and
perhaps final world-wide conflict erupt. In addition, he proposed that the
Great Powers cooperate with each other and with the wider global com-
munity to maintain the hard-won peace. To ensure the effectiveness of
joint actions to suppress threats to peace and security, Hull encouraged
States to maintain armed forces of adequate size and configuration.2
Although lesser powers were excluded from Dumbarton Oaks and the
discussions were a deliberate move by the Great Powers to establish a col-
lective hegemony over the entire globe, there existed, initially, the key to
the success of the proposals put forth at Dumbarton Oaks: political will. A
commitment by the most powerful to construct mechanisms to ensure the
peace and security of all, requiring the participation of all, is a recurring
theme in the effort to establish standing and standby forces.
In the months before the U.N. Charter was signed in May of 1945,
Canada and France voiced conflicting views regarding the theoretical
international army, though there was as yet no consideration of a standing
army with fully-integrated national contingents. Canadian concerns cen-
tered on command and control. Specifically, Canada resisted the idea
that the Security Council could order Canadian troops to any crisis area at
any time by fiat. This concern led to the inclusion of Article 44 in the
U.N. Charter.
Canada was not resisting the establishment of standby force arrange-
ments per se, although its reaction highlighted a point of contention-the
question of national versus international control of what were hitherto
considered national resources. 3
2. BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAw-A WAY TO WORLD PEACE
425 (1983) (citations omitted).
3. One of the reasons for the ultimate refusal of the United States to join the
League of Nations was U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's outright rejection of interna-
tional control over U.S. forces. The issue of command and control has resurfaced
recently with the Italians in Somalia, and repeatedly with the Americans everywhere the
United Nations is involved. Of course, one of the myths of U.N. peacekeeping is that
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The French, however, maintained that the Security Council should
have a standing force available for immediate mobilization and deploy-
ment in order to carry out its mandate effectively. Despite these differ-
ences of opinion, there were no calls for a wholesale re-evaluation of the
Dumbarton proposals when the delegates convened in San Francisco.
The U.S.S.R. in particular was opposed to any significant change to the
Dumbarton proposals. Generally, the signing of the U.N. Charter
reflected an overall consensus on the necessity of creating some sort of
international force.
Dumbarton Oaks clearly illustrates that the United Nations was
founded to prevent a Third World War, by use of force if necessary. But it
was equally clear that the preferred solution would be a political one.
II. Operationalizing the Concept: Clarity of Purpose, Ambiguity of
Execution
In recognition of the fact that a great deal of coordination would be neces-
sary to carry out military operations using contingents supplied by various
nations, Chapter VII of the Charter provided for a Military Staff Commit-
tee (MSC). Composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council (P-5), the MSC was tasked to advise and assist
the Security Council in planning operations and deploying the armed
forces under the P-5's control.
These forces were to act as a formidable deterrent to would-be aggres-
sors. Unlike the League of Nations, whose impotence was symbolized by
the absence of military instruments, the integrated international force
would boast two million ground troops (half provided by the P-5),
thousands of combat aircraft, and hundreds of warships.4 A proposal to
place atomic weapons at the Council's disposal was considered and
rejected in light of the intent of the founders of the United Nations-to
deter aggression through an awe-inspiring display of conventional military
power.
Indications of which model would form the conceptual basis of the
U.N. force surfaced in October of 1944. U.S. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt suggested that prior approval by Congress was not required
before American military power could be made available to the Security
Council. While this arrangement raised constitutional questions (which
remain unresolved to this day), it seemed to resolve other questions-at
least initially. By declaring that the Security Council must have the ability
to act immediately if the peace was threatened, President Roosevelt
seemed to indicate a clear preference for the standby approach. There
was, however, no mention of anyone but the Americans training and
equipping U.S. soldiers, and although the immediate reaction concept
forces are at all times commanded by the United Nations. In fact, they are only so
commanded when permitted by national authorities.
4. Big Five Would Provide Half of Police Total Favored by U.S., N.Y. TImEs, Mar. 24,
1946, at 1.
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suggested a standing force, there was no indication that American forces
would be permanently placed under international control. In any case,
U.S. Congressional opposition (another recurring theme in the history of
U.N. military operations) soon killed the idea.5 By opting out of standing
force arrangements, the most powerful nation on earth had, perhaps
unwittingly, set an example for the rest of the international community.
While the goal of mustering an international force was still very much
alive, America's eschewing of the standing force option did not bode well
for that option's future.
A further setback for efforts to create a military force along the lines
of one of the two models was that the entire concept was inadequately
defined. While some believed that the still-theoretical force would be a
standing one-stationed in one place and under the command of a single
international authority-others believed that nations would maintain con-
tingents earmarked for deployment but would otherwise retain national
command and control. Most media accounts of the debate assumed the
latter.
Further hindering these efforts was the U.N. Charter itself. Article 43
seemed to impose compulsory military service on Member States, but Arti-
cle 44 made contributions to a collective effort to restore international
peace and security subject to prior consultation. With no obligation of Mem-
ber States to serve as an international posse, the likelihood of hammering
out an arrangement for standing forces was dealt a significant blow. While
there was, and still is, hope for formal, binding arrangements, there
remain overwhelming indications that resources will not match rhetoric.
Indeed, this is the experience of U.N. Secretariat members as they attempt
to convince Member States to sign agreements which could lead to auto-
matic assignment of forces.
III. Into the Cold War
Even before the East-West ideological conflict took firm shape, consensus
among the P-5 began to unravel. In 1947, the MSC released a report enti-
tled General Principles Governing the Organization of the Armed Forces Made
Available to the Security Council by Member Nations of the United Nations.6 The
document designated national contributions for U.N. duty: numbers,
equipment, location, and level of readiness, as well as the procedures for
integrating national forces into a large multinational force. In all, the
report recommended forty-one articles, of which only twenty-five were sup-
ported by the P-5.
Soon after, cooperation became a rarity in the Security Council. To
the dismay of the West, the Soviet Union consolidated its hold on Eastern
5. ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG, JR., THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF SENATOR VANDENBERG 112
(1952).
6. General Principles Governing the Organization of the Armed Forces Made Available to the
Security Council by Member Nations of the United Nations, Report of the Military Staff Committee,
U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., Spec. Supp. 1, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/336 (1947).
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Europe. In Asia, the victory of the Chinese communists in 1949 convinced
the United States that a monolithic communist threat committed to the
political destabilization of its neighbours was at hand. Agreement on any
initiative foundered on the rocks of Security Council vetoes. The sole
exception-U.N. action against North Korea in 1950-was made possible
only because the Soviets boycotted Security Council proceedings to protest
America's refusal to recognize Communist China. In any event, the mul-
tinational response to aggression on the Korean peninsula saw the United
States acting as an "agent" of the United Nations. The Security Council
and the General Assembly were barely involved in the organization and
direction of the "police action." Orders received by the theater com-
mander, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, originated in Washington, not
New York. Clearly, impromptu arrangements composed of "coalitions of
the willing" were gaining the upper hand over standing force agreements.
However, the desirability of more formal arrangements- be they
standing or standby-never completely vanished. In 1952, Secretary-Gen-
eral Trygve Lie proposed a "volunteer reserve" composed of national cont-
ingents. Despite these efforts, it was not until after the Suez Crisis in 1956
that the standing force model received serious attention. Recalling the
frantic way in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was
cobbled together and sent to the Sinai (in fact, the initial units of this first
"peacekeeping" force arrived in-theatre within 72 hours), officials began
to talk more openly about a standing military force. Pakistan's Foreign
Minister Firoz Khan Noon first broached the subject in November 1956 by
suggesting that the structure and resources which composed UNEF I be
retained following the end of its mandate. This force would be the
nucleus of a permanent army, staffed, equipped, and trained by the
United Nations. He envisioned deployment of this U.N. army to a series
of strategic areas around the world-a euphemism for potential flash-
points.
An interesting development occurred following the publication in For-
eign Affairs of an article by Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Lester B. Pearson, in April 1957, five months after he was presented with
the Nobel Peace Prize for initiating peacekeeping during the Suez Crisis.7
In an attempt to reduce the complex issue to simple terms the media took
Pearson's suggestion of approaching peacekeeping in a more organized
fashion to mean that a permanent force was the preferred option. In
truth, Pearson advocated a less ambitious path, where national govern-
ments would signal their willingness to contribute contingents for
peacekeeping missions. Pearson did not mention extending the duration
of those commitments beyond the length of the mission's mandate, and
he did not call for mustering forces necessary to fight a war.
The only permanent aspect of this otherwise standby force proposal
was the appointment of a permanent military adviser to the Secretary-Gen-
eral who, along with a small number of staff officers, would carry out the
7. Lester B. Pearson, Force for UN, 35 FOREIGN An'. 395 (1957).
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day-to-day tasks associated with control of U.N. military activities such as
cease-fire monitoring and border patrols. Indeed, Pearson's vision of this
U.N. "machinery" was a cross between the standing and standby models,
since he suggested the non-permanent members of the Security Council
voluntarily contribute troops.
Novel as the idea was, the creation of a standing force was an unlikely
prospect in the political context of the Cold War. With mutual suspicions
and tensions running high, there was little hope that the United Nations
and its organs-chief among them the MSC-would evolve into some-
thing greater than the sum of their parts. The old game of power politics
and the primacy of national interest (reminiscent of America's inter-war
desire to remain isolated from international affairs) resulted in a decisive
lack of collective political will. In this climate, calls for either a standing or
a binding standby force arrangement seemed hopelessly utopian. Still, the
sheer emotional appeal of the idea-an effective, responsive "fire brigade"
responsible to the entire international community-led some to keep the
dream alive and to suggest ways to effect it. While the political obstacles
were formidable (to say nothing of the military and financial ones), the
notion that a permanent force was a cure for all the world's ills was not
frozen by the Cold War.
IV. After the Gulf War: Optimism and Realism
Resurgent interest in a standing force model is largely attributable to the
success of the United Nations during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91.
While some criticized the United Nations because of alleged co-opting by
the United States, the fact that the basis for international action (in the
form of economic sanctions and subsequent military action against Iraq)
lay in Security Council resolutions rather than unilateral action breathed
new life into Article 43 discussions. In 1991, eager to sustain momentum
and to restore control of U.N.-sanctioned operations to an international
authority, former U.N. Undersecretary-General in Charge of Peacekeep-
ing, Sir Brian Urquhart, recommended clarification of the Article 43
clause dealing with the provision of forces for U.N. duty to determine the
feasibility of expanding the "permanent machinery" to include a standing
force.8 One possible reason why this was not considered feasible is the
enduring inability or unwillingness of the principal state actors to
subordinate their national interests and resources to supranational bodies.
Indeed, the speed with which the most powerful members of the coalition
acted following the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis is attributable to the fact
that key national interests were at stake. Ownership of and access to petro-
leum resources, plus the political-military balance of power in the region,
compelled the United States, Britain, France, Canada, and others to mus-
ter their diplomatic and military resources. There was no indication that
8. Brian Urquhart, For a UN Volunteer Military Force, N.Y. REy. OF Boos, June 10,
1993, at 3.
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such a level of commitment was sustainable or repeatable if the nature and
location of the crisis were different.
Nonetheless, since 1991, a number of interested parties have submit-
ted a barrage of proposals to explore various force models. One U.S. uni-
versity study recommended a three-tier model based on a reserve force of
500,000 personnel. This proposed force was to be composed of units
under national command, a smaller, rapid-reaction force under U.N. com-
mand, and a standing peacekeeping force with centrally based and trained
units. 9
In a separate but related development, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) offered troops and infrastructure for peacekeeping
duties in the former Yugoslavia. When these offers were accepted, the
headquarters of NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) was dis-
patched to the Balkans. The genesis of this standby arrangement is in the
Rome Declaration of December 1991, where the sixteen-member alliance
decided to re-configure its force structure in response to the anticipated
challenges of the post-Cold War era. The new three-tier structure com-
prises a ten-division (approximately 250,000 personnel) Allied Rapid Reac-
tion Corps (ARRC), backed by more numerous Main Defence Forces, and
by Augmentation Forces which are kept at lower levels of readiness.
Under normal circumstances, the sixteen-member North Atlantic Council
makes decisions regarding the employment of NATO forces. However,
since the United Nations is the de facto lead agency in the Balkans,
deployment of the ARRC, with its powerful air and land forces and logis-
tics capability, would likely require prior approval of the Security Council.
The most significant development in recent years was the first-ever
meeting of the U.N. Security Council's heads of State onJanuary 31, 1992.
At this meeting, States submitted proposals concerning both force models.
The French supported a force composed of volunteer contingents by com-
mitting 1,000 troops to U.N. peacekeeping. They were not, however, the
first to take such action, as Canada and many other committed
peacekeepers have for some time kept military units earmarked for U.N.
duty. Still, the proposal was somewhat mistakenly treated as a new initia-
tive and was accorded great-and undeserved-media attention (contrary
to some media interpretations, there was no indication that this contin-
gent would be permanently placed under U.N. control). What received
markedly less publicity was that the French offer also required the MSC to
operate as envisaged in the Charter-an unlikely prospect, to say the least.
In any event, the French proposal offered significantly less than what Can-
ada and others had done for decades: maintaining a U.N. standby battal-
ion and skilled individuals ready for deployment at short notice.
At the January 1992 meeting, the heads of State also asked Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to investigate and report on the possibility
9. Alan K. Hendrickson, Defining a New World Order 42-46 (1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author); EDWARD J. DENNEHY ET AL., A BLUE HELMET COMBAT
FORCE 13-15 (1993).
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of making the Security Council more responsive to peace and security
threats. His report, released six months later under the title An Agenda for
Peace, drew upon Article 43 of the U.N. Charter to support the possibility
of establishing units for peace enforcement. 10 The report considered the
provision of forces for a standing army, financial and logistical support,
and other issues critical to successful peacekeeping. The U.N. Committee
of 34 (Peacekeeping Operations) made additional calls for formal
arrangements in its 1994 report."
In February of 1993, in a major shift of U.S. foreign policy, President
Clinton unveiled Presidential Draft Directive 13 (PDD-13), which would
have established a new set of criteria for American participation in U.N.
peacekeeping operations. Some of these criteria were: a clear and pres-
ent danger to international security, a demonstrable threat to U.S. inter-
ests, and sufficient domestic support for the operation. Some analysts
maintained that these criteria could not be easily satisfied, thereby lessen-
ing the chance of necessary American involvement in certain crises. A
significant aspect of PDD-13 was that placing U.S. military units under for-
eign command was permissible if the unit was no larger than a battalion
and the possibility of combat was negligible. However, PDD-13 did not
mention standby availability of any U.S. forces. Indeed, the directive per-
mitted U.S. troops to question the orders of their non-American superiors
on the grounds of military competence. This was hardly a vote of confi-
dence in the United Nations.
In any event, PDD-13 was never signed, ostensibly because "apart from
a tiny intellectual/practitioner community there was no constituency for
peacekeeping in the United States."' 2 PDD-13 was superseded in 1994 by
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) which placed even more con-
ditions on American participation in peacekeeping operations. Most nota-
ble among these conditions were: that the U.N. mandate be extremely
clear, that the disputants agree in advance to a cessation of hostilities, and
that the duration of the mission is known in advance. Regrettably, it is
doubtful whether these criteria can be met either in whole or in part. The
loss to the international community, which is still struggling to address the
types of conflict the United States has pledged to avoid, has yet to be mea-
sured. However, there is still room for the United States to play a pivotal
role in peace and security operations, even if not on the front lines. By
lending its vast logistical and strategic transport resources to the United
Nations, the United States can overcome some of the troubles which have
plagued past and present multinational operations-namely timely force
deployment and sustainment. It is unclear whether the new Republican-
10. BouTRos BOUTROS-GHALi, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY,
PEACEMAKING, AND PEACEKEEPING (1992).
11. Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their
Aspects, U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
49/136 (1994).
12. Christopher Brady & Sam Daws, UN Operations: The Political-Military Interface,
INT'L PEACEKEEPING, Spring 1994, at 58, 63-64.
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controlled Congress will follow through on its position that the United
States should not be a major player in peacekeeping.'8
V. Enduring Issues and Challenges
At present, there is little chance that the P-5 will move any closer to the
conclusion of any formal arrangements for a standing force. Rather, for
political and operational reasons, U.N. operations will for the foreseeable
future be characterized by their ad hoc nature. In the first place, the
reluctance to relinquish control of one's human and material resources,
acquired and maintained at enormous expense, is understandable where
freedom of action is considered key to the realization of foreign policy
goals. If a crisis affects the core interests of a given state whose forces are
not under national command, but does not, in the opinion of the United
Nations, present a threat to international peace and security, the state in
question may find itself powerless to respond. Suggestions that the United
States, either unilaterally or with its closest allies, could have ejected Iraqi
forces from Kuwait without the consent of the United Nations is a case in
point.14 The matter is further highlighted by the (overly) stringent condi-
tions for American involvement in peacekeeping operations. Recent dec-
larations by senior members of the Republican Party that U.S. troops will
neither take part in initiatives which are tangential to American interests,
nor serve under foreign command, suggest that any formal arrangement is
without U.S. support. In that case, efforts to establish standing or standby
force arrangements are bound to fail.
Another dimension of political will involves faith (or lack thereof) in
the ability of international organizations to devise and implement effective
mandates. If the mission objectives and rules of engagement are unclear
(as was the case in Somalia, where there was disagreement over whether
the warring factions could or should be disarmed), or if disputants are
permitted to defy the terms of the mandate (as is the case in the former
Yugoslavia where Bosnian Muslim and Serb armies were permitted to
attack and launch attacks from U.N.-designated "safe havens"), conflict
management will surely fail. In such cases, the result is a mandate which is
no longer enforceable and an organization which is neither credible in
the eyes of the combatants, nor worthy of support in the eyes of its mem-
bers. Moreover, the intractability of a conflict acts as a strong disincentive
to multinational intervention, thereby undermining one of the principal
justifications for maintaining standing or standby forces.
13. Already, many Republicans have advocated the reduction of non-defense
expenditures-such as peacekeeping-in order to fund higher-priority programs. See
Philip Finnegan, Republicans Eye Conversion, Peacekeeping Cuts, DEF. NEws, Nov. 14, 1994,
at 1, 18.
14. Brady & Daws, supra note 12, at 64. According to the authors, experience in
Korea and Kuwait has persuaded high-ranking U.S. officials that a separation of policy-
making (U.N. responsibility) and implementation (U.S. responsibility) is efficient, and
that standby arrangements are unnecessary.
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The desirability of a standing U.N. force has its roots in the belief that
such a force is more professional, responsive, efficient, and financially sup-
portable than those available under current arrangements.1 5 This argu-
ment is plausible because training will be standardized, emphasizing U.N.
methods of operation (likely including a mix of diplomatic, policing, and
traditional military skills), and the force will have the means to project and
sustain military power over long distances and for long periods of time.
A reduction in reaction time is achievable if troops are organized into
well-trained units stationed at bases around the globe with the requisite air
and sea transport capabilities. But responsiveness is not dependent on
organization and material resources if the deployment is delayed by polit-
ical wrangling over the substance of a mandate. Indeed, international crit-
icism levelled at the relief mission to Rwanda did not focus on any lack of
air transport capability, but rather at the reluctance of the international
community to employ it in a timely fashion.
Efficiency in the planning and preparation stage may heighten the
chances of mission success, particularly if the size of the planning staff is
enlarged to facilitate coordination between the relevant departments and
organs of the United Nations, as well as between the force commander
and U.N. headquarters. A permanent, twenty-four-hour staff in New York
City may have deflected criticism by senior members of the United Nations
Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) that their concerns regarding the pro-
gress of the mission went unheard after-hours and on weekends. On the
other hand, it is not clear whether efficiency has suffered decisively under
the current ad hoc system. A U.N. military headquarters, located outside
of New York City, with responsibility for the planning and conduct of ini-
tial peacekeeping operations, seems necessary.
The notion that a standing peacekeeping force would be financially
more stable than a standby force assumes that a secure source of funding
would be available throughout the duration of a mission. Since money, in
the standing force model, is collected in advance and held in a
"peacekeeping fund," refusals to support a mission do not irrevocably ter-
minate it. However, the adequacy of such arrangements is questionable if
the level of peacekeeping activity rises sharply and missions are lengthy.
In the 1990s, an unforeseen increase in the number and scope of U.N.
missions led financially-strapped governments to avoid open-ended com-
mitments and to withdraw political and financial support for missions that,
in their estimation, were not proceeding well. Some good examples are
the departure of Canadians from Cyprus after almost three decades and
the withdrawal of the Italian contingent from the Somalia operation fol-
lowing a disagreement with the force commander. In any event, the fact
that the sizeable debt accumulated over decades of peacekeeping has not
demonstrably crippled U.N. operations suggests that the reputed financial
advantages of the standing force model are illusory.
15. For an in-depth analysis of these "advantages," see PAUL F. DIEHL, INTERNA-
TIONAL PEACEKEEPING (1993).
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States with common interests may share a clarity of purpose which will
help forge a consensus, thereby overcoming doubts surrounding the com-
parative advantages offered by permanent arrangements over impromptu
ones. Operationally, planning and execution may go considerably
smoother, and command and control may be more solid, if the partners
have previously taken part in joint command and field exercises. Indeed,
if efforts to fine-tune (and not replace) the ad hoc approach to fit differ-
ent mission contexts are made, there would be even less requirement for
alternate arrangements. Given the complexity of conflict in the 1990s,
where a multitude of security threats, acting alone or in combination, may
threaten international peace and security, the peacekeeping force which
responds must possess diverse capabilities. As events in Bosnia and
Namibia have shown, traditional peacekeeping methods, buttressed by
peacebuilding, are necessary to rebuild and restore a war-torn society to
long-term self-sufficiency. Increasingly, states recognize the benefits of the
New Peacekeeping Partnership (NPP). NPP is the term applied to the
military, government, and non-government agencies dealing with humani-
tarian assistance, refugees, displaced persons, election monitors, media,
and civilian police personnel as they work together to improve the effec-
tiveness of peacekeeping operations. 16 This concept was developed by the
Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre,
an independent institution established by the Government of Canada in
1994, to enhance the Canadian contribution to international peace, secur-
ity and stability. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre fulfills this mandate
through research, education, and training in all aspects of peacekeeping.
Clearly, this inclusive approach is not only responsive, but flexible.
The partnership is configurable to the unique requirements of each mis-
sion, and various non-military actors may pool their efforts with the Blue
Helmets and create a truly integrated peacekeeping and peacebuilding
"force." Although a coordinated effort between the partners may not nec-
essarily imply integration under a single authority, the NPP concept allows
the constituents of the force to draw upon one another's experience and
strengths. With this concept under constant development at the Pearson
Peacekeeping Centre, an important new dimension has been added to the
debate over how best to meet the security challenges of the 1990s and
beyond.
Conclusion
It is questionable whether the idea of a permanent army for U.N. opera-
tions has ever been seriously regarded as a viable tool for conflict manage-
ment. It has certainly generated a significant amount of interest by
scholars, statesmen, and the media, and its emotional appeal is still strong.
But the barriers to its adoption have historically been, and arguably still
are, insurmountable. The spirit of cooperation which, it was hoped,
would characterize the post-Cold War international system has not materi-
16. See Morrison, supra note 1.
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alized. This spirit is not, however, non-existent. While national interest
and a fear of costly entanglements has dampened enthusiasm, there is
broad agreement that existing measures can and should be improved. In
the near-term, it is unlikely that these improvements (if they are made)
will take the form of a greater willingness to allocate resources to a U.N.
volunteer reserve, since national interest and national control are, for
many states, synonymous. But if the ultimate objective is to improve the
chances of mission success, other alternatives (including an operational
headquarters with regional branches) and improvements to existing
arrangements (through the New Peacekeeping Partnership) may have
much to offer.
One or more of these alternatives may result from an initiative
launched by Canada at the 49th session of the U.N. General Assembly
(UNGA). Its aim is to suggest improvements in the rapid reaction capabil-
ity of the United Nations. The study has encompassed three multi-day
meetings designed to explore all facets of the subject, prepare a draft
report, and consult with many U.N. Member States. According to the
Canadian Minister of National Defence, some of the matters being consid-
ered include:
(1) the possibility of establishing a standing operational headquarters to
conduct operational planning for peace support missions;
(2) means of improving existing standby arrangements and of defining the
potential relationship between an operational headquarters and the
military and civilian organizations that might, in an emergency, come
under its direction;
(3) ways to standardize training; and
(4) ways in which the organization of security and cooperation in the Euro-
pean code of conduct are adaptable to the needs of the United
Nations. 17
The final report of the study will be presented to the 50th session of the
UNGA. Other countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium are pursu-
ing similar initiatives.
It is virtually certain that the United Nations will not establish a per-
manent military force. However, out of this current round of studies and
discussions will come a renewed interest in making the United Nations
more effective. That, in itself, is no mean feat.
17. Honourable David Collenette, PC, MP, Minister of National Defence, Enhancing
UN Rapid Reaction Capability: The Importance oftPractical Pmposals, Address at the Interna-
tional Conference on U.N. Rapid Reaction Capability (Apr. 7, 1995) (on file with
author).
VoL 28
